In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (information controller) can influence voters' choices by designing the information content of a public signal.
Introduction
Uncertainty gives rise to persuasion.
-Anthony Downs (1957) Information is the cornerstone of democracy, as it allows voters to make better choices.
In many important cases, however, uninformed voters are not free to launch their own investigations, and must rely on the inquiries of others. For example, in most trials a juror may not choose which tests are performed during the investigation, or which questions are asked to a witness -jurors must rely on the prosecutor's investigation and questions. In politics, the Legislative branch often must rely on information generated by investigative reports produced by the Executive. In firms, shareholders and the Board of Directors typically depend on reports commissioned by the CEO. If the individual choosing the questions and the voters have di↵erent preferences, then she may strategically design her investigation to persuade voters to choose her preferred alternative.
In this paper we study how an individual (the "information controller") influences the decision of voters by strategically designing a public signal, that is, by engaging in information control (e.g., Brocas and Carrillo 2007, Duggan and Martinelli 2011, Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). We first study how the voting rule and the distribution of voters' preferences a↵ect the controller's choice of a signal. We show that with a non-unanimous voting rule and heterogenous voters, the controller can design a signal with realizations targeting di↵erent winning coalitions. That is, the signal exploits preference disagreement across voters. Consequently, under simple-majority, a majority of voters might be strictly worse o↵ due to the information supplied by the controller. To prevent this negative impact, voters may adopt a supermajority voting rule that induces the controller to supply a more informative signal.
In our model, a group of uninformed voters must choose whether to keep the status quo (or default) policy, or to implement a proposed new policy. This can be interpreted as voters choosing between an incumbent politician and a challenger, shareholders choosing to approve or not a merger, members of a jury choosing between a guilty or not guilty verdict, or members of a legislature choosing to approve or not a new law. Prior to the election, the information controller can sway voters' decision by designing what voters can learn from a public signal, i.e. by specifying the statistical relation of the signal with the underlying state.
1 After observing the signal and its realization, voters apply Bayes' rule and reach a common posterior belief. They then choose an action (vote) and the electoral rule dictates the electoral outcome.
We focus on the case of pure-persuasion, where the information controller wants to maximize the probability of approval of the proposal, independently of the state (in Section 5.2
we consider a controller with state-dependent payo↵s). We study two classes of institutional rules. The first is delegation, and serves as a benchmark. Under delegation, one member of the group acts as a dictator and chooses his preferred policy given his beliefs. The second is the class of k-voting rules, where a proposal replaces the status quo if it receives k or more votes. We focus on k -voting rules because they are important and prevalent in practice, and because they allow us to derive sharp equilibrium characterizations and comparisons.
Since the controller's signal is public and voters have no private information, there is no information aggregation problem. Hence, the strategic voting considerations related to the probability of being pivotal are absent in our model.
We start by characterizing the optimal signal when the approval decision is delegated to voter i, who absent further information would reject the proposal. The controller maximizes the probability of approval by designing a signal such that, whenever voter i approves the proposal, he is just indi↵erent between approval and rejection. This implies that voter i does not benefit from this signal when he is the decision maker. In fact, voter i would prefer to delegate the approval decision to a "tougher" voter j to induce the controller to supply a more informative signal (where voter j is "tougher" than i if, for every belief, approval by j implies approval by i).
We then characterize the optimal signal under a k-voting rule. We establish that a kvoting rule is payo↵-equivalent to delegating the decision to a particular "weak representative voter." This result allows us to relate the optimal signal under the k-voting rule to that under delegation. Given a k voting rule, do voters benefit from the controller's signal? We show that under a simple majority rule, the controller's influence always makes a majority of voters weakly worse o↵. We then define conditions such that a majority of voters is strictly worse o↵.
This happens when the controller's optimal signal targets di↵erent winning coalitions, that is, when the controller exploits voters' preference disagreement to increase the probability of approving the proposal. Interestingly, this can happen even when all voters would agree on their decision if they knew the true state.
Anticipating the controller's influence, which k-voting rule do voters prefer? Voting rules a↵ect outcomes not only by the amount of information voters have of the proposal's relative merits, but also by the consensus required to approve the proposal. In particular, requiring a higher consensus (higher k-voting rule) may lead to an excessive rejection of the proposal.
However, it may also induce the controller to provide a more informative signal. We study Consider a set of potential decision makers and a voter who can choose to whom to delegate the approval decision. The decision makers are totally ordered according to their "toughness", and rank states in the same order as the voter, where "higher" states imply that the proposal delivers a higher net payo↵. For any such set, we show that the voter has single-peaked preferences over decision makers. Consider now a k-voting rule and an electorate who shares the same ranking of states. We extend the previous result to show that each voter has single-peaked preferences over k-voting rules. Moreover, a majority of voters always prefers a supermajority rule over simple majority. Finally, if voters also agree under full information, then every voter prefers unanimity over any other k-voting rule. That is, even heterogenous voters may agree on the optimal electoral rule.
Our paper is related to the recent literature on information control. In Brocas and Carrillo (2007), a leader without private information sways the decision of a follower in her favor by deciding the timing at which a decision must be made. As information arrives sequentially, choosing the timing of the decision is equivalent to shaping (in a particular way) the information available to the follower. Duggan and Martinelli (2011) consider one media outlet that can a↵ect electoral outcomes by choosing the "slant" of its news reports. The media in Duggan and Martinelli is constrained in the set of signals it can design (it must be a "slant"). In contrast, we consider an information controller who is unconstrained in her choice of signal.
Our paper is most closely related to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (KG henceforth). They develop the fundamental methodology to solve this class of unconstrained information control problems, when players have common priors. Alonso and Câmara (2014a) study information control when players have di↵erent prior beliefs. As in our paper, Michaeli (2014) Rayo and Segal (2010) study optimal advertising when a company can design how to reveal the attributes of its product, but it cannot distort this information. Kolotilin (2014) focus on how the receiver's private information a↵ects the sender's choice of a signal. In a somewhat di↵erent setting, Ivanov (2010) studies the benefit to a principal of limiting the information available to a privately informed agent when they both engage in strategic communication.
controller without private information and a controller who privately knows the state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 solves for the controller's optimal signal. Section 4 studies voters' preferences over institutional rules. Section 5 extends the basic model. Section 6 applies our results to relevant voting models. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
General Setup
Policy and Decision Makers: A group of n voters must choose one alternative from a binary policy set X = {x 0 , x 1 }, where x 0 is the status quo (or default) policy, and x 1 is the proposal. This can be interpreted as voters choosing between an incumbent politician and a challenger, choosing to approve or not a ballot measure, members of a jury choosing between a guilty or not guilty verdict, or members of a legislature choosing to approve or not a new law. The collective decision is made following established institutional rules, which we discuss momentarily. Each voter i 2 I ⌘ {1, . . . , n} has preferences over policies that are characterized by a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i (x, ✓),
with ⇥ a finite state space. State ✓ 2 ⇥ captures the realized value of payo↵ relevant variables, such as the relative competence of di↵erent politicians, or the productivity of di↵erent sectors of the economy. All players share a common prior belief p = {p ✓ } ✓2⇥ , which has full support in ⇥.
Information Controller: One information controller C, who is not a member of the group, has preferences over policies characterized by a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u C . We focus on the case of pure-persuasion were the controller's preferences are independent of the realized state, u C (x) : X ! R (in Section 5.2 we consider a controller with state-dependent payo↵s). The controller can influence the decision of the group by designing a public signal that is correlated with the state. Before the group selects a policy, the controller chooses a signal ⇡, consisting of a finite realization space S and a family of likelihood functions over S, {⇡(·|✓)} ✓2⇥ , with ⇡(·|✓) 2 (S). Signal ⇡ is "commonly understood": ⇡ is observed by all players who agree on the likelihood functions ⇡(·|✓), ✓ 2 ⇥ (see Alonso and Câmara 2014a for a discussion of this assumption). Players process information according to Bayes rule. Let q(s|⇡, p) be the updated posterior belief 3 of every voter after observing ⇡ and its realization s.
We make two important assumptions regarding the set of signals available to the con- 
Institutional Rules
After observing the realization of the controller's signal, the group chooses one policy x 2 X. The institutional rules governing the collective decision process are summarized by a mechanism = ( 1 , . . . , n , h), which defines a strategy set i for each member i and an outcome function h : 1 ⇥ . . . ⇥ n ! X. Given belief q, mechanism and utility functions
be a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy profile played in this game. Together and ⇤ (q) implement a social choice function g(q) : (⇥) ! X, which defines the group's equilibrium policy choice as a function of beliefs. Therefore, for any signal ⇡ and realization s 2 S that yields belief q, the controller's payo↵ is given by
Our main goal is to study how di↵erent institutional rules a↵ect the optimal choice of a signal and the equilibrium payo↵ of players. We focus on two classes of institutional rules: delegation, which serves as a benchmark, and k-voting rules, where a proposal replaces the status quo if it receives k or more votes. We focus on k-voting rules because they are important and prevalent in practice, and because they allow us to derive sharp equilibrium characterizations and comparisons. We now formally define these institutional rules.
Delegation: Decision rights are fully delegated to a particular player d 2 I. Mechanism = { 1 , . . . , n , h} has d = X, where individual d chooses a policy d (q) and this policy is implemented, h( 1 (q), . . . , n (q)) = d (q). In equilibrium, player d acts as a dictator and chooses x 2 X that maximizes his expected payo↵,
If there are multiple optimal policies, we assume he chooses the one preferred by the information
It follows from Berge's maximum theorem that v is upper-semicontinuous.
k-voting rule: Proposal x 1 is selected if and only if it receives at least k votes, where k 2 {1, . . . , n} is the established electoral rule. Mechanism = { 1 , . . . , n , h} has i = {0, 1}, where i (q) = 1 represents voting for proposal x 1 , and i (q) = 0 represents voting for x 0 -we abstract from abstention. The outcome function h is h( 1 (q), . . . , n (q)) = 8 < :
Given a belief q, we apply the following two equilibrium selection criteria in case of multiple equilibria:
1. If policy x yields voter i a strictly higher expected payo↵ than policy x 0 , then he votes for x;
2. If the two policies yield voter i the same expected payo↵, then he votes for the policy preferred by the information controller.
The first criterion rules out uninteresting equilibria such as, when k < n, all voters vote for the status quo independently of expected payo↵s. Importantly, in our model voters have no private information about the state, so there is no information aggregation problem.
Hence, the strategic voting considerations related to the probability of being pivotal are not relevant in our setup. From the set of equilibria satisfying the first criterion, we select the subset of controller-preferred equibria, which guarantees that the controller's expected payo↵ v is an upper semicontinous function of posterior beliefs. Let ⇤ i (q) be the equilibrium choice of voter i that satisfies the previous selection criteria. The social choice function is
As in Alonso and Câmara (2014a), we focus on language-invariant Perfect Bayesian equilibrium: a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which individual decisions depend on posterior beliefs, but not on the actual signal or realization -for every signals ⇡ and ⇡ 0 , and signal realizations s and s 0 for which individual i has the same posterior belief q, he chooses the same equilibrium strategy ⇤ i (q). Note that if game G has multiple equilibria, then the social choice function g implicitly selects which equilibrium is played.
Information Controller's Problem
For any signal ⇡ and realization s 2 S that yields posterior q, the social choice function g determines the implemented policy -the controller's payo↵ v(q) is then defined by (1). The information controller selects a signal that maximizes E ⇡ [v(q)]. Upper-semicontinuity of v both with delegation and with k-voting rules ensures the existence of an optimal signal (see KG). Moreover, choosing an optimal signal is equivalent to choosing a probability distribution over q, subject to the constraint E [q] = p. That is,
For an arbitrary real-valued function f define e f as the concave closure of f ,
where co(f ) is the convex hull of the graph of f . The following remarks follow immediately from KG:
(R1) An optimal signal exists;
(R2) If the approval decision is delegated to one voter, then there exists an optimal signal with card(S)  2. With a k-voting rule, there exists an optimal signal with card(S) 
(R3) The information controller's expected utility under an optimal signal is
For the remaining of the paper we focus on the case where u
loss of generality, set u C (x 1 ) = 1 and u C (x 0 ) = 0. Therefore, the controller's expected payo↵ V is simply the equilibrium approval probability under an optimal signal.
Definitions and Notation
We next present a series of definitions and notation that will be useful in our analysis.
Notational Conventions: For vectors q, w 2 R J , we denote by hq, wi the standard inner product in R J , i.e. hq, wi = P J j=1 q j w j , and we denote by qw the component-wise product of vectors q and w, i.e. (qw) j = q j w j .
Voter's Type: Define the conditional net payo↵ for voter i when the state is ✓ as
The vector i = { i ✓ } ✓2⇥ captures the preferences of the voter, and we call i the type of voter i. When voter i holds belief q, he votes for x 1 if and only if 
Since a voter's type defines his voting behavior, we use the term "voter " to refer to a voter with type . 
, that is, the set of beliefs that assign probability zero to every approval state.
Relevant Sets -Electorate: Consider an electorate { 1 , . . . , n } and a k-voting rule. Define the win set
That is, voters implement x 1 if and only if q 2 W k . Given the k-voting rule, there are
possible minimal winning coalitions of k voters. The win set is then the union of all possible minimal winning coalitions. Under unanimity rule k = n, the win set is the intersection of all approval sets, W n = \ i2I A( i ). If k = 1, then the win set is the union of all approval sets,
Note that W n is convex, but W k might be a non-convex set when k < n. Given the electorate, define B as the collection of all coalitions of at least n k + 1 voters, with typical element b 2 B. Define the set of strong rejection beliefs
That is, R k is the set of beliefs such that there exists a "blocking" coalition b, with voters 2 b assigning probability zero to every approval state.
Finally, we use V ( ) and V (W k ) to denote the equilibrium approval probability with delegation to voter and with a k-voting rule with win set W k .
Classes of Voters' Types: It is useful to group voters according to their types. To this end, let z be a permutation z : ⇥ ! {1, . . . , card(⇥)} that strictly orders the states. Define the class of types
That is, class F z includes all voter types who (strictly) rank states according to the conditional net payo↵ ✓ in the order defined by z. We say that voter i "ranks states" according
Ordering Voters: We introduce two orders on the space of voter types. First, we say that voter is "tougher" than voter 0 if A( ) ⇢ A( 0 ). Second, we say that voter is (weakly) "harder-to-persuade" than voter
. That is, under the optimal signal, the equilibrium approval probability under an optimal signal with delegation to voter is (weakly) lower than with delegation to 0 .
Representative Voter: Fix a k-voting rule and an electorate { 1 , . . . , n }. Voter is a "representative voter" if A( ) = W k , that is, the proposal is approved with a k-voting rule if and only if it would be approved with delegation to voter . Voter is a "weak representative
, that is, if the information controller's equilibrium expected payo↵ is the same when she only has to convince voter and when she has to convince at least k voters.
Information Control
In this section we first solve for the controller's optimal signal both with delegation and with a k-voting rule. We then study how the controller's gain from designing the signal varies with the electoral rule and the distribution of voters' preferences.
Information Control with Delegation
Suppose that the approval decision is delegated to voter . Which signal would the controller optimally supply? If p 2 A( ), then the controller provides a completely uninformative signal, as the voter approves the proposal in the absence of additional information. Now suppose p / 2 A( ) and A( ) 6 = ;. The characterization of the optimal signal obtains from two observations. First, the controller would never benefit from providing additional information after the realization of an optimal signal. Therefore, after observing a signal realization that induces rejection voter must assign zero probability to every approval state ✓ 2 D( ) (see also Proposition 4 in KG), and thus his posterior belief must lie in the strong rejection set R( ).
Second, any signal realization that leads to approval must induce a posterior belief in A( ).
While there is a multiplicity of optimal signals, under delegation one can always construct an optimal signal with only two signal realizations. To do so, starting with an arbitrary optimal signal ⇡ ⇤ one can group all approval signal realizations into a single realization associated to a posterior that is the probability-weighted convex combination of all approval posteriors. One can likewise obtain a single signal realization by grouping all rejection signal realizations in a similar fashion. Importantly, A( ) and R( ) are both convex sets, so the posterior belief obtained from combining all approval realizations still leads the voter to approve, and combining all rejection realizations still leads the voter to reject, so that the probability of approval remains the same.
We now provide a geometric interpretation of the controller's optimal signal. Consider a signal ⇡ supported on {s , s + }, where s + induces approval posterior q + 2 A( ) and s induces strong rejection posterior q 2 R( ). Holding constant q , s + becomes more likely as the posterior q + becomes closer to the prior p. Conversely, holding constant q + , s becomes less likely as q is further away from p. Consequently, the controller would like to resort to both an approval belief q + in A( ) that is closest to the prior, and a rejection belief q in R( ) that is farthest from the prior. The martingale property of Bayesian updating requires, however, that q + , q and p must all be collinear. The following lemma shows that the optimal signal balances these two goals as it corresponds to lines through the prior that maximize the ratio of the distances described in (3).
Lemma 1 Consider delegation to voter , with p / 2 A( ) and A( ) 6 = ;. Let ⇡ ⇤ be any controller's optimal signal supported on {s , s + }, where voter approves the proposal if and
be the (Euclidean) distances from the prior to the sets A( ) and R( ) along the line l. Then
and
.
The next Proposition shows that the solution to (3) can be understood as the optimal choice of a cuto↵ state.
Proposition 1 Consider delegation to voter , with p / 2 A( ) and A( ) 6 = ;. Let ⇡ ⇤ be any controller's optimal signal supported on {s , s + }, where voter approves the proposal if and
, and
Moreover, while voter never gains by making decisions with the signal ⇡ ⇤ , the controller's
To understand (4) 
If ✓ > 0 for at least one ✓, then the controller can increase the probability of approval by distorting this signal in a way that rejection states with a small incremental loss (i.e. small | ✓ | ) still induce approval. The controller can do so until the voter's net value from approval is identically zero, as indicated by (4) . This also implies that the voter gains nothing from making decisions with ⇡ ⇤ , as he is indi↵erent between approval and rejection after observing s + .
Example 1: Consider three states, ⇥ = {✓ 1 , ✓ 2 , ✓ 3 }, and a single voter such that Figure 1 depicts on the simplex the approval set A( ) and the strong rejection set R( ), which is the bottom line segment. The prior p is such that
Figure 1(a) shows the approval posterior q + 2 A( ) that is closest to the prior, and the strong rejection posterior q 2 R( ) that is furthest from the prior. However, there is no binary signal that induces these posteriors, since q + , p and q must be collinear. Figure   1 (b) shows the posterior beliefs induced by an optimal signal satisfying condition (3). Using (4), ✓ 2 is the cuto↵ state: P r[s
Information Control with a k-Voting Rule
A basic insight of information control under delegation is the existence of a binary optimal signal: one realization leading to approval, and the other leading to rejection. This is possible Lemma 2 Fix a k-voting rule and electorate { 1 , . . . , n }. The probability of approval under an optimal signal is
, with
. (5) We now contrast equilibrium payo↵s with a k-voting rule to equilibrium payo↵s with delegation to a voter . Voter is a representative voter if A( ) = W k : in this case, the expected utility of all players with the k-voting rule is equivalent to delegating the decision to voter . 5 In many situations, however, a representative voter does not exit. Nevertheless, the next proposition establishes that one can always construct a weak representative voter.
Proposition 2 Fix a k-voting rule and electorate { 1 , . . . , n }. There exists a weak representative voter
, then the expected utility of all players under a k-voting rule is the same as under delegation to voter ⇤ (k).
Typically voter ⇤ (k) is not part of the electorate. As {q : hq,
. That is, a k-voting rule is equivalent, from the controller's perspective, to delegation to a "less tough" decision maker. Notwithstanding,
is also the hardest-to-persuade among all voters with approval beliefs containing W k . To see this, let G(W k ) = { : W k ⇢ A( )} be the set of voters who are "less tough" than the k voting rule. The proof of the Proposition shows that
Moreover, if the weak representative voter ⇤ (k) strictly ranks states, then the ex-ante expected utility of all voters is the same with the k-voting rule as with delegation to voter ⇤ (k). This reflects the fact that if
Proposition 1 is unique and provides the same expected utility to all voters as the outcome of a k-voting rule.
An important di↵erence between delegation and k-voting rules is that, except for unanimity, the controller can exploit conflict between voters to increase the chance of approving the proposal. This is always the case if the optimal binary signal for ⇤ (k) would not induce approval under a k-voting rule, i.e. letting q + ( ⇤ (k)) be the approval posterior belief associated to (4), then q
be the set of approval posterior beliefs induced by an optimal signal, we must have hq,
. Therefore, the representative voter ⇤ (k) describes precisely the direction of voters conflict: if an approval realization doesn't secure the support of one winning coalition, it must secure the support of another. Essentially, the controller exploits the change in the identity of the winning coalition (and hence the identity of the pivotal voter) with the signal realization by tailoring the signal to persuade winning coalitions with opposing interests on the hyperplane hq,
In many important applications, voters have di↵erent preferences but agree on the ranking of the states -for example, state ✓ represents the "quality" of the proposal, as in the public good example in Section 6.1. The next lemma characterizes the weak representative voter from Proposition 2 when all voters agree on the ranking of the states.
Lemma 3 Consider an electorate { 1 , . . . , n } with all n 2 voters on the same class, i 2 F z for some permutation z. Given a k-voting rule, there exists a weak representative voter ⇤ (k) in the same class as the electorate,
By establishing that ⇤ (k) must be in the same class as the electorate, Lemma 3 allows us to relate the optimal signal with a k-voting rule to the optimal signal with delegation. With delegation to ⇤ (k), there is an optimal signal supported on {s , s + }, with a cuto↵ state ✓ 0 as described in Proposition 1. As voters rank states in the same order as ⇤ (k), they all agree that s + is "good news" about the proposal, while s is "bad news". Although signal s + is enough to persuade ⇤ (k) to approve, it might not secure k votes from the electorate.
As the next example shows, the controller then decomposes s + into realizations targeting di↵erent winning coalitions.
Example 2: Consider 3 states, ⇥ = {✓ 1 , ✓ 2 , ✓ 3 }, and two voters, A and B , where prior beliefs and net values are as follows:
Without further information voters strictly prefer to reject the proposal. First suppose that the voting decision is delegated to voter A . Figure 2 (a) depicts the posterior beliefs induced by an optimal signal ⇡ ⇤ A , using Proposition 1.
6 The equilibrium probability of approval is 0.325. Signal ⇡ ⇤ A is also optimal if the decision is delegated to B . In both cases, the controller's influence does not change voters' expected payo↵. 6 Formally, S = {s , s + }, P r(s + |✓ 3 ) = P r(s + |✓ 2 ) = 1, and P r(s + |✓ 1 ) = ). Probability of approval is P r(s = s 
Value of information control
The next Corollary provides comparative statics of k-voting rules on the value of information control. (iv) The value of information control is a single-peaked function of k, possibly non-monotone.
Parts (i) to (iii) follow immediately from Lemma 2. To understand (iv), suppose that the value of information control strictly decreases from rule k to rule k 0 = k + 1. This means that the value of information control was strictly positive under k. From (i) this implies p / 2 W k , yielding p / 2 Wk for anyk > k. From (iii) we know that the probability of approval decreases in k, hence the value of information control must weakly decrease from rule k on.
Voter Heterogeneity and Information Control
Proposition 2 showed that the controller can, under non-unanimous voting rules, exploit voter heterogeneity by designing a signal that induces approval from di↵erent winning coalitions.
In e↵ect, under a k-voting rule the controller designs approval signal realizations along directions of voter disagreement in such a way that there is always a coalition of at least k voters willing to approve the proposal.
A natural question then is: would the controller prefer to persuade a group of voters rather than an individual voter to whom the decision is delegated? To make this statement precise, suppose that voters are ordered according to how "hard" it is for the controller to persuade them, i.e., if i < i 0 then V ( i ) V ( i 0 ). Thus, voter 1 is the easiest voter to persuade, while voter n is the hardest. The following proposition provides a su cient condition for the controller to prefer a k voting rule to delegation to the k-th hardest voter.
Proposition 3 Consider an electorate { 1 , . . . , n }, and index voters according to how hard it is to persuade them individually,
Part (i) captures the immediate observation that the controller can do no worse if she only requires one vote, regardless of the voter's identity, rather than the vote of a given voter. Conversely, the controller cannot benefit from securing the approval of all voters simultaneously rather than the approval of a given voter.
Part (ii) states that if voters are su ciently aligned -i.e., all voters rank states in the same order -then the controller would prefer a decision process where he needs to persuade at least k voters, rather than persuading the k th hardest-to-persuade voter. That is, the controller benefits from some heterogeneity, but requires some alignment between voters.
The intuition is that, when voters rank states in the same order, then the approval signal realization under an optimal signal to the k-th hardest-to-persuade voter also induces approval for any voter i < k. Therefore, V (W k ) cannot fall below V ( k ). Finally, the controller su↵ers no loss from persuading a collection of voters under a unanimity rule rather than the hardest-to-persuade individual. That is, under unanimity (6) is satisfied with equality.
Inequality (6) holds whenever voters agree on the ranking of states. If voters rank states di↵erently, then the reverse inequality to (6) may hold. The reason is that an optimal signal when facing the k-th hardest-to-persuade voter may not secure approval from all easier-topersuade voters i < k (see Example 5 in the online Appendix B). Interestingly, sometimes an optimal signal does not target the easiest-to-persuade voter, even when voters agree under full information and rank states in the same order (see Example 6 in the online Appendix B).
Institutional Design
We start this section with a simple question: given a voting rule, do voters benefit from the signal chosen by the controller? We then study how di↵erent voting rules a↵ect the payo↵s of di↵erent voters. Importantly, voting rules a↵ect outcomes not only through the consensus required to approve a proposal, but also by the amount of information that voters endogenously receive. For example, under delegation the controller provides the sole decision maker with some information about the state, although the signal has no value for the latter (cf. Proposition 1). As a result, a single decision maker may prefer to delegate the choice to someone with di↵erent preferences than himself, but who will elicit more information about the benefits of the proposal. (ii) If k < n and p 2 W k , then the controller's influence does not a↵ect payo↵s; (iii) If k < n and p / 2 W k , then at most k 1 voters are strictly better o↵ under the controller's influence. Thus, at least n k +1 voters are weakly worse o↵ under the controller's influence.
These voters are strictly worse o↵ if there is no optimal signal with a binary realization space.
In particular, with a simple majority voting rule, a majority of voters is weakly worse o↵ because of the controller's influence.
For any given k-rule, if p 2 W k , then the controller's optimal signal reveals no relevant information and voters approve the proposal. In this case, the controller's influence has no impact on voters' expected payo↵s -which concludes part (ii). Part (i) follows from the same logic when p 2 W n , and the veto power of voters when p / 2 W n : if the rule is unanimity, then in order to approve the proposal the controller must convince all voters at the same time. However, for any non-unanimous voting rule, the controller can exploit preference disagreement by choosing signal realizations that target di↵erent winning coalitions. Part (iii) highlights that it cannot be the case that k voters are strictly better o↵ by the controller's influence. Otherwise, the controller could strictly increase the probability of approval by choosing a less informative signal that leaves the same k voters weakly better o↵, but at least one of them indi↵erent. Moreover, whenever the posterior belief q + 2 co(W k ) obtained from combining all approval realizations of ⇡ ⇤ is such that q + / 2 W k , then n k+1 voters are strictly worse o↵. This is the case if there is no optimal signal with only two signal realizations, which implies that the controller must be targeting di↵erent winning coalitions. 
Voter preferences over decision makers
Suppose that the approval decision is made by a single voter : the controller only needs to persuade this voter. Now suppose that voter can choose whom to delegate the approval decision. How would voter rank di↵erent decision makers? As mentioned earlier, voter faces a well known trade-o↵ between the gain in information and a loss of control: delegating to someone with di↵erent preferences can lead to inferior decisions, but may induce the controller to provide a more valuable signal. To study this trade-o↵, we first characterize voter preferences over decision makers for a suitably-defined restricted domain. We then show that, in these domains, a voter can always resolve the previous trade-o↵ perfectly as a voter's preferred decision maker would (i) induce from the information controller a most valuable signal for voter , and (ii) for that signal, there is no loss of control.
The next proposition describes the preferences of a voter over decision makers that belong to the same class F z , that is, rank states in the same order z. (iii) The maximum expected utility of voter v when delegating to any decision maker in R |⇥| , optimal signal must have at least three signal realizations, then the controller needs at least two di↵erent signals leading to approval, which implies that the controller must be targeting di↵erent winning coalitions.
is achieved by any voter
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition describe the preferences of voter v over decision makers who share his ranking of states and are ordered according to toughness. This condition on alignment does not guarantee that there is no loss of control under delegation, as these decision makers may not have the same approval set as v . Part (i) shows that a voter has single-peaked preferences over such decision makers. That is, the set inclusion ordering derived from toughness translates naturally to single-peaked preferences when one restricts attention to voters in the same class. Part (ii) shows that the voter's preferences become monotone when the decision makers agree with v under full information.
These results follow from the basic structure of an optimal signal with delegation to a voter in F z : the controller sets a threshold state and the optimal signal induces approval if a state with a higher net value occurs. Then, switching to a tougher decision maker implies a (weakly) higher threshold state and a (weakly) smaller set of approval states. Importantly, a tougher decision maker induces a signal that discriminates better between states of higher net value and states of lower net value for all voters in F z . Therefore, switching to a marginally tougher decision maker benefits voter v whenever the current threshold state has a negative net payo↵, but it proves detrimental whenever this net payo↵ is positive. If all decision makers agree with v under full information, then this net payo↵ is always negative. , then a majority of voters weakly prefer unanimity voting rule over simple majority.
Part(iii) identifies in

Voter preferences over k-voting rules
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To draw stronger inferences about voters' equilibrium payo↵ under di↵erent voting rules, we need to consider the nature of voters' preference heterogeneity. The next lemma shows that, if voters belong to the same class, then each voter has single peaked preferences over k.
Lemma 4
Consider an electorate { 1 , . . . , n }, with i 2 F z , for some permutation z. Then each voter i has single peaked preferences over k, in the sense that there exists k ⇤ ( i ) such that his expected utility is non-decreasing in k for k < k ⇤ ( i ), and it is not increasing for
Proposition 2 shows that voters' expected utilities with a k voting rule are the same as with delegation to the weak-representative voter ⇤ (k), as long as ⇤ (k) strictly ranks states.
Lemma 3 established that if all voters are in the same class, then the weak representative voter also belongs to that class. The intuition behind Lemma 4 is that since the weakrepresentative voter ⇤ (k) also belongs to the same class F z , then a voting rule requiring a higher consensus is equivalent to delegating to a tougher voter. As a result, the collection of representative voters ⇤ (k) describes a totally ordered set of voters in F z , and Proposition 4(i) implies that each voter has single-peaked preferences over these decision makers, and hence, over k-voting rules.
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An important implication of Lemma 4 is that a majority of voters prefer a supermajority voting rule over a simple majority voting rule.
, then a majority of voters might prefer simple majority over unanimity when unanimity makes approving the project too unlikely, e.g., if the win set W n is empty. (ii) strictly prefer supermajority k 0 over simple majority if it leads to a lower (but positive) equilibrium probability of approval,
The next Proposition provides su cient conditions for all voters to have the same preferences over k-voting rules.
Proposition 5 Suppose that all voters are in F z and they agree under full information. Then every voter weakly prefers a (k +1)-voting rule to a k-voting rule, for k 2 {1, ..., n 1}.
This proposition implies that even heterogenous voters may have the same preferences over electoral rules. In fact, as long as there is agreement under full information and voters rank states in the same order, then they all prefer a unanimity rule to any other k-voting rule.
Essentially, su cient alignment among voters can induce perfect agreement over electoral rules if information is endogenous to the electoral rule. Indeed, while voters may disagree under uncertainty, if they agree under full information, then they also agree on the signal they would choose if they were in control of decisions and could design the signal themselves. The intuition is that the weak representative voters { ⇤ (1), . . . , ⇤ (n)} (i) belong to the same class, (ii) agree under full information, and (iii) are totally ordered according to toughness. Therefore, the conditions of Proposition 4(ii) apply and every voter has monotone preferences: as a higher k corresponds to a tougher weak-representative voter, voters prefer rules that require more consensus only because they induce the controller to supply a more valuable signal.
Extensions
Controller knows the State
In our basic setup the controller has no private information. ⇡ ⇤ is also an optimal signal in the case of an uninformed controller. Together these two results imply that the equilibrium probability of approving the proposal is una↵ected by the controller privately learning the state.
Controller's Payo↵ Depends on the State
In our basic setup we focus on the case of pure-persuasion. We now consider a controller with a state-dependent payo↵ u
To simplify presentation, suppose C ✓ 6 = 0. First suppose that the approval decision is delegated to voter . Proposition 6 in the online Appendix B generalizes Proposition 1. It shows that the optimal signal always induces an approval realization for states such that both controller and voter agree on approval, and it always induces a rejection realization for states such that both agree on rejection. In the set of states where there is disagreement, the optimal signal again defines a cuto↵ state. However, in the case of pure persuasion the cuto↵ state was defined by ordering the states solely according to the voter's net payo↵ ✓ ; now the cuto↵ is defined by ordering the disagreement states according to the absolute value of the ratio of players preferences,
In many important cases the controller ranks states in the same order as the voter. For example, the controller receives the same payo↵ as the voter, plus some private benefit from approving the proposal (see also our application in Section 6.1). Proposition 7 in the online Appendix B shows that if the information controller and the electorate rank states in the same order, then each voter has single-peaked preferences over k-voting rules. Moreover, if voters also agree under full information, then the payo↵ of every voter is weakly increasing in k. 
Preference Shocks
In our basic setup the controller knows the preference profile of the electorate. However, in some instances voters are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks, in which case the controller faces a probability distribution over preference profiles. To study the e↵ects of preference shocks, assume that voter i's preferences are given by u i (x, ✓, µ i ) and the conditional net payo↵ from approval with state ✓ and private shock µ i is µ. Under this optimal signal, voters have almost surely a strict preference between approval and rejection of the proposal, so that voters obtain a strictly positive gain with probability 1 when they approve the proposal. Therefore, unlike the case of non-probabilistic voting, with unanimity all voters can strictly benefit from the controller's influence. For non-unanimous voting rules, the results from Corollary 2 carry over to cases with a smallμ. In particular, with a simple majority voting rule, a majority of voters can be made strictly worse o↵ by the controller's signal.
Shocks
The same is true with delegation: the controller's signal targets to persuade the voter with the worst possible shock. Hence, the voter can strictly benefit from the signal.
Heterogenous Prior Beliefs
In our base model, players share a common prior belief about the consequences of di↵erent 
Applications
Voting on a Public Good
Consider a one-period k-voting model where an odd number n 3 of voters must choose whether to approve (x = x 1 ) or not (x = x 0 ) the investment on a new public good, e.g., construction of a new highway overpass to improve tra c. If implemented, the cost c of the project is paid through a proportional tax t. Each voter i has a pre-tax income w i and the government budget must balance. For simplicity, suppose there are no other government expenditures. Hence, the status quo tax is t 0 ⌘ 0, and it increases to t 1 ⌘ c P i2I w i if the project is implemented. Voters' payo↵ from the project depends on state ✓ 2 ⇥ ⇢ R. This represents the uncertainty about how the overpass will a↵ect the overall tra c flow. A voter-specific payo↵ y i : ⇥ ! R captures how each voter is a↵ected by tra c flow changes, depending on factors such as where the voter lives and works. Let y i be strictly increasing, so that a higher "quality" ✓ means a better tra c outcome. The utility function of each voter is then
For each voter i compute the net payo↵ from approval
All voters belong to the same class F z since i ✓ strictly increases in ✓. Voter i with posterior belief q votes to approve the project if and only if the expected payo↵ from the tra c outcome is greater than how much he has to pay in taxes to implement it, E[y i (✓)|q] t 1 w i .
Consider an information controller who has vested interests on the project -e.g., the controller is the Governor who proposed the project, but she needs voters to approve the ballot measure. Suppose that the Governor ranks states in the same order as voters. For example, her net payo↵ is proportional to the change in her "political capital," which is increasing in the quality of the project. Moreover, suppose she receives additional private benefits (e.g., ego rents) from approving the project.
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Lemma 3 imply that for each k voting rule there is a weak representative voter ⇤ (k) 2 F z , and from the point of view of all players the k-voting rule is payo↵-equivalent to delegating the approval decision to ⇤ (k). Moreover, the controller's optimal signal ⇡ ⇤ defines a cuto↵ quality ✓ ⇤ k such that the project is always rejected if the quality is below the cuto↵,
, and the project is approved with certainty if the quality is above the cuto↵, ✓ > ✓ ⇤ k . If it is optimal to target di↵erent winning coalitions, then ⇡ ⇤ contains multiple signal realizations that lead to approval. Cuto↵ ✓ ⇤ k weakly increases with k. Importantly, if the controller is more biased towards approval than voters, that is, P t 1 w i . Therefore, voters are totally ordered -voters with higher income are both harder-to-persuade and tougher, w i < w j implies
. Let k be the voter with the k th lowest income. Voter k is then a representative voter and a k-voting rule is equivalent to delegating the 13 Note that the controller's ranking of the states does not change if her private benefit from approving the project is either constant or strictly increasing with the project's quality. decision to him. Increasing the k-voting rule implies that the controller must target a richer voter. Suppose that the controller is more biased towards approval than the median voter m , P ✓2D( C ) p ✓ m ✓ < 0. Lemma 5 implies that a majority of voters (the median and richer voters) weakly prefer any supermajority voting rule over simple majority. Moreover, this preference relation is strict if voter k is strictly richer than the median voter and his approval set is not empty. By delegating the approval decision to a richer voter, who pays more to implement the project, the electorate induces the controller to supply a more informative signal. This result does not require the median voter to agree with k under full information. ⇤ 
Spatial Model of Elections
Consider an election where a left-wing incumbent politician is running for re-election against an untried challenger from the opposing right-wing party. Let X = {L, R}, where L represents re-electing the incumbent and R electing the challenger. Each voter has a utility
, where y i captures the ideology of voter i and y x is the policy implemented by politician x. There is an odd number n 3 of voters with ideologies symmetrically distributed around the median voter y median = 0. Voters know more about the incumbent than the challenger. Formally, voters know that the incumbent is committed to a policy y L < 0, but they are uncertain about the policy y R > 0 that the challenger would implement if elected. Voters' prior belief is that y R = ✓ with probability p ✓ , where
Suppose that without further information the median voter strictly prefers the incumbent.
For each voter i the net payo↵ from electing the challenger is
Voter i strictly prefers the challenger if (✓
, and he strictly prefers the incumbent if y i < ✓+y L 2
. Therefore, the voter with the k-th lowest ideology y i is the representative voter. Consider a simple majority rule, so that the median voter is decisive. Under full information, the median voter strictly prefers the If the IG is moderate, y C <ȳ, then the IG's preferences are su ciently aligned with the median voter. In this case, the more informative signal provided by the IG strictly benefits the median voter.
14 Note that
Therefore, a strict majority of voters -voters with ideology y i < ✓ 1 -rank all states in the same decreasing order. Voters y i > ✓ M rank all states in the same increasing order.
Winners and Losers
We now study an application inspired by the model of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) , who highlight the role of individual-specific uncertainty when voters must decide whether or not to engage in an economic reform.
15
There are three sectors in the economy, L, M and R. The population of workers, who are also voters, is distributed uniformly across the sectors. Voters must decide whether to implement an economic reform x 1 (e.g., sign a trade agreement with other countries) that increases the productivity of one sector, but decreases the productivity of the other sectors.
Players have a uniform prior believe over which sector ✓ 2 ⇥ = {L, M, R} will benefit from the reform. The reform increases the payo↵ of workers in sector ✓ by +1, and decreases the payo↵ of all other workers by 1.
Consider a simple majority voting rule. Without further information, each worker believes that he is more likely to be a loser than a winner. Therefore, the proposal delivers a negative expected payo↵ and all voters reject the proposal. With full information about the state, voters in the winning sector ✓ vote to approve, but voters in the two losing sectors form a majority and reject the proposal.
Consider an information controller who wants to maximize the probability of approval.
The controller can design a partially informative signal that guarantees the approval of the proposal. The optimal signal does not reveal the identity of the winning sector. Instead, it reveals the identity of one losing sector. 16 Upon learning this information, the losing sector votes to reject, but the two other sectors vote to approve. They now believe that there is an equal chance of being a winner or a loser.
With the controller's influence and a simple majority rule, the proposal is approved independently of the state. Consequently, the controller's strategic information provision strictly lowers the expected payo↵ of all voters. All voters would strictly prefer a unanimity voting rule to block the influence of the controller. With unanimity, the win set is empty 15 We are also grateful for suggestions by Navin Kartik. and the reform cannot be implemented.
Conclusion
In important cases, acquiring information is infeasible or prohibitively expensive for individual voters. Voters must then rely on the information generated by certain individuals, who control the design of a public signal (e.g., jurors and prosecutor, voters and media, shareholders and CEO). Obviously, if the controller and voters share the same preferences, then the controller's signal always benefits voters, as it allows them to make better decisions.
However, this is not true if there is a conflict of interest between the controller and voters.
We show that, with a simple majority rule, a majority of voters is always weakly worse o↵ by observing the information provided. In fact, all voters can be strictly worse o↵, even when they would agree on their decision if they knew the true state. This is so because the controller strategically designs a signal with realizations targeting di↵erent winning coalitions.
To prevent this negative impact, voters may adopt a supermajority voting rule that induces the controller to supply a more informative signal. We also provide conditions for unanimity to be the rule preferred by all voters.
We extend our analysis in a number of ways. We show that the controller cannot benefit from privately observing the state prior to choosing her signal. We study situations in which the controller also cares about the state and situations where voters are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks. In these cases, a voter may now strictly benefit from the controller's signal if he is the sole decision maker, although a majority of voters can still be worse o↵ under a simple majority rule. We also extend the analysis to allow voters to have heterogeneous prior beliefs, so that they openly disagree about the likelihood of the state. Importantly, even if they all share the same ranking over states and agree under full information, belief disagreement can translate into disagreement over the optimal electoral rule.
Two interesting extensions are to allow for voters' to privately acquire information and then deliberate prior to voting, and to allow voters to choose among multiple policy options.
We see these extensions as promising and leave them for future work.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Under the assumptions, the set A( ) is non empty and the voter rejects the proposal if he has no additional information. Let ⇡ 0 be an arbitrary binary signal that induces posterior beliefs {q (⇡ 0 ), q
implies that average posteriors must equal the prior so that
and q (⇡ 0 ) p and q
Therefore,
where, by construction, k(q
As the optimal signal maximizes Pr[Approval], it must be that the optimal signal corresponds to a vector l ⇤ that maximizes the ratio 
Therefore, ↵ must solve the following linear program
Note that for any ✓ 0 such that
< 1 relaxes the approval constraint and increases the approval probability. Therefore, suppose that
while reducing ↵ ✓ by " leaves unchanged the approval constraint but increases the probability of approval by "p
> ✓ . Now suppose that voter strictly ranks states so that ✓ 6 = ✓ 0 for ✓ 6 = ✓ 0 . Then there can only be one "cuto↵" state that satisfies (4), and given that the approval constraint is met with equality, the optimal binary signal must be unique. 
Note that each 2 G(W k ) corresponds to a "less tough" voter than the k-voting rule, in the sense that any voter in G(W k ) would approve the proposal if the electorate does so under a k-voting rule. Moreover, as G(W k ) describes all hyperplanes that contain W k , then we have
⇤ is a weak representative voter when the win set is co(W k ). As explained in the text, for any belief in co(W k ) the controller can find a signal that induces approval with probability 1. Therefore V (W k ) = V (co(W k )), and ⇤ is also a representative voter for 
Program (11) is concave (as it maximizes a concave function over a convex set). Consider the Lagrangian L associated to (11)
with ⌫ ✓ , µ ✓ ,  0, and 1 ✓ is the unitary vector whose ✓-component equals 1. Suppose that W k is non-empty and has at least two di↵erent elements. This implies that W k has a nonempty relative interior, so that the constraint qualification is satisfied and the Karush-KuhnTucker conditions are both necessary and su cient for optimality (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004) . In particular, when p / 2 co(W k ), ↵ ⇤ is an optimal solution if and only if there exist
where @f (↵ ⇤ ) is the set of subgradients of f at the point ↵ ⇤ , Define
In particular, as ↵ ⇤ satisfies (12) it also satisfies (13) 
k be the set of all k coalitions of voters with generic element s. Then \ 2s A( ) describes the win set associated with a unanimous decision when the electorate is restricted to the coalition s, and W k = [ s2S k \ 2s A( ). As \ 2s A( ) is the finite intersection of half-spaces {q 2 (⇥) : hq, i 0} , then any supporting hyperplane of \ 2s A( ) at q 2 int( (⇥)) can be represented as a convex combination of { : 2 s}. Moreover, co(s) ⇢ F z , as ranking of states is preserved under convex combinations. Thus any supporting hyperplane of \ 2s A( ) at an interior belief corresponds to a voter in F z . Turning to co(W k ), consider any point q 0 2 int( (⇥)) with q 0 2 @ (co(W k )) and a supporting hyperplane {q : hq, v(q 0 )i = 0} of co(W k ) at q 0 . Since q 0 2 co(W k ), Caratheodory's theorem guarantees the existence of J  card(⇥)+1 points, {q i }, i = {1, ..., J}, with q i 2 W k and q 0 2 co(q i , i = {1, ..., J}). We consider two possibilities: (i) at least one of the points q i is in int( (⇥)), (ii) any representation of q 0 as a convex combination of points {q i } with q i 2 W k must correspond to points on the faces of the simplex (⇥), i.e. for each i = {1, ..., J 0 } there exists ✓ i such that q i
Consider first case (i) in which q i 2 int( (⇥)) for some i. Then {q : hq, v(q 0 )i = 0} must also be a supporting hyperplane of W k at q i . Furthermore, since q i 2 W k there exists a k coalition s such that q i 2 \ 2s A( ) and thus {q : hq, v(q 0 )i = 0} is a supporting hyperplane of \ 2s A( ). However, as all supporting hyperplanes to \ 2s A( ) in int( (⇥))
can be associated to a voter in F z , then v(q 0 ) 2 F z . Consider now case (ii) where every representation of q 0 as a convex combination of points in W k involves points that lie on (possibly di↵erent) faces of the simplex (⇥), and let {q i }, i = {1, ..., J} be such a collection of points. As each q i 2 W k , and {q : hq, v(q 0 )i = 0} is a supporting hyperplane of co(W k ) then there exists a coalition s i such that min 2s i hq i , i = 0, and let i be a voter at which this minimum is achieved. That is, coalition s i would support approval for belief q i with at least one voter being indi↵erent between approval and rejection. 
. This implies that signal ↵( k ) would induce approval for any i < k such that V ( k )  V ( i ). Therefore, the optimal signal to persuade voter k has an approval signal realization that would induce the approval vote of at least k voters. Therefore
Proof of Corollary 2:
In the text.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Without loss of generality, suppose that z(i) = i so that for 2 F z we have ✓ i < ✓ i+1 , i 2 {1, ..., card(⇥) 1}. From Proposition 1, the controller's optimal signal when the decision is made by voter 2 Part (i)-The increment in the expected utility of voter v under delegation to rather than choosing always the status quo is
We now show that voter v has single peaked preferences among voters in D. Select two voters , 0 2 D with A( 0 ) ⇢ A( ). From Proposition 1, this implies that
where the inequality follows from v ✓ i < 0 if i < i 0 ( v ). Second, suppose that i ↵ ( ), i ↵ ( 0 )
i( v ). Then, ↵ ✓ i ( ) = ↵ ✓ i ( 0 ) = 0 if i < i 0 ( v ), and thus
where the inequality follows from v 
